We analyse the 'probable cause' of the 1979 Chicago DC-10 accident using a minimal formalism, and find an omission. The omission is contained in the body of the report. This omission had consequences for the public discussion of this accident, which we show. We conclude that formalism helps in accident reporting by enabling simple consistency and omission checks. We then present a quick overview of our formal method, WhyBecause Analysis, which provides the necessary mechanisms and rigor. We consider this to be the engineering of causal reasoning. As is now known from a quarter-century's experience with verification of digital systems, such reasoning engineering is both essential and non-trivial.
Accident reports in aviation present careful reasoned conclusions about causes and causal factors contributing to the accident, as well as providing pro forma details which may be useful in other contexts, say for statistical investigations of accident types. In order to establish the need for engineering this reasoning, we exhibit an example of the kind of problem that can arise through using the current informal methods. Second, we briefly describe our own "reasoning engineering" method for causal analysis, Why-Because Analysis, or WBA. WBA is similar in scope and rigor to verification methods familiar in computer science. It extends such methods in that it explicitly encodes a rigorous causal logic.
First, the statement of 'probable cause' of the Chicago-O'Hare 1979 DC-10 accident (NTSB-AAR-79-17) :
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the aircrafl because of the uncommanded retraction of the left wing leading edge slats [...I A " Warm-Up" Example Let us take first a simple hypothetical example to illustrate the method. An aircraft stalled, hit the ground, and was destroyed. That the aircraft was destroyed fits the definition of "accident" (significant damage to aircraft andor loss of human life or severe injury). Let us apply the above steps. Stage 1. The crucial events are [2] the aircraft stalled Why was the aircraft destroyed?
Because it hit the ground Using the notation above, this is 'Why [O] ? Because [ l] ', or, as we shall write it below, That seems straightforward enough. Whether the event of the aircraft hitting the ground and the event of the aircraft being destroyed are the same "event" is something philosophers have argued about, but common sense use of the word suggests they're really two descriptions of the same event, so we shall go with this usage.
Why Let us summarise what we have done.
We started to determine the "why ... because ..." relations amongst the factdevents, and found we had insufficient facts. We added a necessary causal factor (Stage 1+) and modified the derivation (Stage 2+). This revisiting is usual in formal methods, and could be named the 'inevitable intertwining' or 'spiral' (after Swartout and Balzer (SwBa82) , respectively Boehm (Boe86)). The final causal relation that we obtained in Stage 2+ holds as well for the airplane at 100 feet as for the airplane at 3000 feet. At 100 feet, noone expects a stall recovery to be effected in time, so one imagines it could be left unsaid. Our why ... because ... method seems to insist it be put in. Does it need to be said? Our view is, in an accident report, yes. A clear statement could lead to useful research into stall recovery in less than 100 feet. If it's not said, no-one will remark this possibility. (A parallel case might be the history of "pilot error" determinations, and the progress made in overall system design since one started asking why the pilots were making such errors, rather than accepting "pilot error'' as a final reason beyond which no more need be asked.)
Prima facie, such a simple analysis could help us identify missing causal factors and ensure that our causal analysis is more correct. Let us now apply it to the statement of probable cause in the Chicago report. We shall see the same phenomenon, but with more details. [5] and [6] were not involved in the causal chain leading to the accident, and that they were indeed involved as causal factors, then this is inconsistent and there is a problem with the logic of the report.
Analysing the Probable
The solution to this apparent inconsistency turns out to be, as before, that something is missing from the causal chain expressed in the 'probable cause' statement. This omitted fact is, however, clearly described in the body of the report. This says clearly that because the flight crew were unaware of the slat retraction, they didn't know that the stall speed had increased, and they flew the airplane "in accordance with procedures" which dictated a speed slower than the new increased stall speed. It was thus inevitable that the airplane's left wing would stall. There was no indication to the pilots of this impending stall because the stall warning system was also inoperative. Had there been, one imagines that they would have reacted immediately (the indications are that they were excellent pilots, who the report says were flying exactly 'by the book') and the airplane could have been controlled (the report has stated, above, that the airplane was controllable, derived from simulator tests).
Hence the report says that pilots' ignorance of the asymmetrical flap condition and impending stall allowed the stall of the left wing to take place. Thus there is an essential causal fact missing from the 'probable cause' statement, namely:
[9] pilots continued to fly the airplane at below left-wing no-slat stall speed
Thus the causal chain should read
which reinstates [5] and [6] to their intuitively proper places in the causal chain, and completes the chain as awaited.
So the logic of the report is faulty. The 'probable cause' statement includes an incomplete causal chain. A simple semi-formal analysis of the report itself, namely just asking what the critical events were as expressed, and what the report says are their causal relationships, has exposed this incompleteness, and demonstrated the inconsistency in the report itself.
Consequences for Public Policy
Well, OK, an engineer might reply, maybe the report's reasoning doesn't satisfy the logical nit-pickers, but we can all figure this out from the report for ourselves, so why worry? The answer is that the statement of probable cause for significant accidents has consequences for public policy, and this policy may be mistaken in so far as the statement of probable cause is based on incorrect causal reasoning. Let us then take a quick look at what the public consequences were.
There was considerable public interest at the time concerning the engineering of the DC-10 because of the accident. McDonnell Douglas issued a report (McD79) 
Conclusions About the Use of Formalism
This accident and report come from 20 years ago. One may ask, is this still relevant? We would answer yes, because while there has been considerable advance in the engineering of reasoning in, for example, computer science, especially with regard to distributed and safetycritical digital systems, none of this science has yet made it into other engineering domains such as accident analysis; we needed to motivate its introduction.
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Our simple formalisation has shown infelicities in the NTSB report of its conclusions concerning the Chicago crash. McDonnell Douglas felt the need for public clarification, and a clear statement of the facts. However, full information on one necessary causal factor was not provided in their clarification. This is consistent with the omission of this factor from the statement of probable cause in the NTSB report. We can imagine that public and professional discussion of the accident, an essential factor for public risk assessment as it is now conceived (NRC96), could have been aided by simple formalisation, which demonstrates this omission. This is not the only example to demonstrate advantages of this simple formalism. In (LaLo98), it was shown using the same technique that two necessary causal factors, the position of an earth bank and the state of the runway surface, were omitted from the 'Causes' statement of the report on the A320 accident in Warsaw in September 1993. Both of these are under control of the Polish authorities, yet recommendations to the authorities were only that the system of collecting and distributing meteorological information should be adapted to conform to ICAO Convention Annex 3 standards, and that the bank should be described in the AIP Poland (the official description of airports). One can thus observe from the formalisation that the recommendation prima facie does not conform precisely to all the necessary causal factors, and imagine that it would have helped the goals of accident analysis to have addressed this apparent disparity in the report itself.
A WB-Analysis of the report of the American Airlines Accident in Cali in December 1995, also in (LaLo98), has found causal omissions, namely that the pilotcontroller interactions did in fact causally contribute to the accident, contrary to what is stated in the report, but consistent with the NTSB's recommendations to the FAA concerning the accident, We conclude that formalisation helps. It enables us to check not only the events, but also the reasoning concerning those events and the derivation of the conclusions and recommendations in an accident report. Now on to the proposal for engineering the reasoning.
Why-Because Analysis
Why-Because Analysis (WBA) is a method we developed for the failure analysis of complex, open, heterogeneous systems. The adjective 'open' means that the behavior of the system is highly affected by its environment. Aviation operations are significantly affected by the weather through which aircraft fly, for example, and landing risks are significantly affected by obstacles and their clearance on the approach and go-around paths. The adjective 'heterogenous' means that the system has components of different types that are all supposed to work together: digital, physical, human and procedural components, and combinations of some or all of these. Modern aviation operations have all of these components and thus form a complex, open, heterogeneous s ys tem.
The First Step -the WB-Graph Method
The WB-Graph (or WBG) Method develops the WB-Graph of the failure scenario, as in the examples above (the causal chain is called a "graph" because it may be drawn as a mathematical graph, and we have tools to do that -see below). The WB-Graph is a complete statement of the causal relations between all the events and system states of significance for causally explaining the failure scenario. The WBG Method consists broadly speaking of the two steps we illustrated above:
list: make a list of all the events and states of significance; determine causal relations: determine the causal relations between all these, exhaustively, using the semantical test for 'causal factor' explained in Section
The Logical Semantics of Causal Explanation.
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The first step is what an investigator does 'in the field', and is not new. The second, however, is unique to the WBG Method. It is a rigorous, objective assessment of the facts which produces a causal explanation which is objectively justifiable. The approach used builds on Lewis's seminal studies in the logic of causal explanation, as explained below.
The Second
Step -Verification But how does one know that one has not himherself made errors when using the WBG Method? The full.WBA includes 0 formal proofi a formal proof method which enables one rigorously to prove 1. that the causal relations asserted by the WB-Graph are correct, and 2. that sufficiently many factors have been identified to provide a sufficient causal explanation of each identified fact that is not a root cause. What is the purpose of formal proofs?
In system verification, experience shows that attempting a formal proof leads an experienced analyst very quickly to problems and mistakes in the analysis. In computer science contexts, attempting formal proof has exposed mistakes in widely-used telecommunications protocols, in the design of digital processors used in avionics, in clock-sychronisation algorithms for digital flight control systems, in the security of transactions in distributed databases, and in the design of cache-coherence protocols for multiprocessors. A formal proof in WBA provides an objective assessment that the analysis performed in the WBG phase is correct and relatively sufficient.
The formal-proof step of WBA can, and should, be omitted until analysts and investigators have familiarised themselves with and feel comfortable using the WBG Method. WBA specialists in formal proof can always be brought in to help if particularly sensitive investigations require the level of certainty attained by formal proof and local expertise is insufficient.
The WBA formal proof method is based upon a leading proof method used in the specification and verification of digital systems, the hierarchical proof method of Lamport (LamTLA). All formal proof methods are technically involved and mathematical, require some specialist training to use, are best left to technical documentation (LamTLA) (LaLo98), and therefore we forego more detailed comment on the WBA proof method here.
Finding all the Facts -the Method of Difference
Finally, how does one know that one has identified all the facts salient for an explanation? One cannot be completely sure by use of logic alone --unfortunately, one cannot rule out using pure logic the (rather silly!) possibility that a fuel-tank explosion was caused by little green men playing inside it with matches. So some judgement has to be used (Artificial Intelligence specialists confronted with the same issue call such judgement a 'closed world assumption'). Nevertheless, most investigators will know of cases in which something has been missed. For example, had the nearly-intact FMS not been found at the site of the Cali accident, significant explanatory facts would not be known, and the explanation of the accident would be unsatisfactory and incomplete.
In the Cali case, before the discovery of the FMS, one knew that there were things about the navigational behavior of the aircraft that required explaining but which the available facts were insufficient to explain. But how about the cases in which we don't know that we don't know? WBA promotes use of a version of Mill's Method of DifSerence (Mi143), which is roughly the following. with a situation in which that is not to be had --but it does provide a precise delineation of the problem area, and so enables prophylactic measures for future avoidance of the problem area to be designed as reasonably and as precisely as possible. Use of the PAD to describe areas of uncertainty is somewhat technical and is explained in (LaLo98).
MD:
Human Actions -The PARDIA Classification To analyse human operator behavior, WBA uses an information processing classification (Nor88). which we call PARDIA (LaLo98, Ch. 7, The PARDIA Classification). PARDIA stands for the sequence of stages in effective (or ineffective) situational response:
As with any other component of the heterogeneous system, humans receive input from other components (normally through their senses) and, as 'output', influence other components of the system through action. The PARDIA classification classifies failure in the human component into one of the above components of the PARDIA sequence. Why are there six components to PARDIA (others use four, for example)? We have found that improvements to the system that may be suggested to prevent a recurrence vary significantly according to the category of error. We have found that to each of the six categories, particular different sorts of system improvement can be recommended. These are listed in (LaL098, Ch. 7, The PARDIA Classification). We call PARDIA a classification rather than a model because we don't claim that humans behave as ifthey were PARDIA automata --they may or they may not --but we do claim that the classification helps significantly in determining which sort of prophylactic measures for avoiding repeat incidents would be successful.
Formal Specification of Procedures and Regulations
The final feature of WBA is that the relevant procedures for human operators, and the regulations which govern them, may be formally specified in exactly the same manner as the behavior of the physical or digital components of the system. Again, this is not new --work in the 1980's in Artifical Intelligence showed that significant portions of legal statutes could be satisfactorily represented as a logic program. However, we are the first to apply such techniques to aviation procedures and regulations. The procedures and regulations, as well as the PARDIA classification, are specified all in the same formal language that the WBA proof system uses, thereby obtaining the benefits of using a 'wide-spectrum' language for this task.
Tools
WBA is supported by a number of freeware computer and design tools. The most important are: 0 WB-Script is a language for describing a WB-Graph in written form.
wb2dot is a tool, available for direct use over the WWW, that takes input in WBScript and automatically draws the WBGraph in Postscript. wb2dot invokes a parser for WB-Script which produces input for the dot graph-drawing tool from AT&T Research, passes this input to dot, and then files the Postscript output for downloading by the wb2dot-user. wb2dot was developed in the PERL multiplatform programming language. Various editing and checking tools based on freeware document preparation tools (GNU Emacs pf-mode, LaTeX style-file pjAy, DATR-check) are available. Difference. To handle resulting irreducible uncertainties, WBA proposes a method using PADS. To classify human behavior, WBA uses PARDIA. Finally, an attempt at formal proof that the explanation pictured in the WB-Graph is correct, based on a description of the incident in a wide-spectrum formal language, will expose hitherto unnoticed hiatuses in the explanation, and successful proof finally provides an objective criterion for determining the correctness of the causal explanation proposed. To our knowledge, WBA is the only failure-analysis method which provides all these features. Tools are available to support various aspects of WBA.
Analyses Performed To Date
Seven WBAs have been performed to date and one is in progress. Five of these analyses used the WB-Graph Method alone. Three include a formal proof.
The Logical Semantics of Causal Explanation
The WB-Graph Method is based on a formal semantics for causality introduced by the philosophical logician David Lewis of Princeton University (Lew73), (Lew86ii). Roughly speaking, the semantics of Lewis for the assertion that A is a causal factor of B, in which A, respectively B, is either an event or state, is that in the nearest possible world in which A did not happen, neither did B. This relies on a notion from formal semantics of 'possible world, best illustrated by example. Suppose my office door is open. But it couZd have been shut. A semanticist can now say: in another possible world, it is shut. A possible world is a way of talking about things that could happen, but didn't. But what about 'near' possible worlds? The 'nearest' possible world in which my door is shut is one in which my door is shut, air currents around it behave appropriately, sound through it is muffled as it should be, but broadly speaking everything else remains the same. A further-away world would be one in which someone else who is not me is sitting here typing, and an even further-away world is one in which this whole environment is situated in Ghana rather than Germany. Now, suppose my door shuts. What caused it to shut? I was pushing it shut. The air was still, there was no draft, the only thing moving was the door and it was moving because I was pushing it shut. Intuitively, my actions caused the door to shut. How do 1 know this from the formal semantics? In the nearest possible world in which I didn't push the door, did the door shut? We have already supposed that nothing else was moving, no air drafts, no other person in the vicinity, so in the nearest world these would also be the case. It could be that all the molecules in the door moved the same way at the same time, so the door spontaneously shutbut this situation is so highly improbable as to be almost unthinkable, so could it be really the nearest such world? No. In the nearest world, everything behaved the same way, except that I didn't push the door. So it didn't shut. So according to my formal semantics, my action caused the door to shut. This formal semantical test is particularly important in circumstances in which many causal factors conjoin to make something happen, which is by far the most 0-7803-5749-3/99/$10.00 0 1999 IEEE usual case. The simple semantics asks a question of two events, or states, at a time, and by asking the question systematically of all pairs, pair by pair, a complex WB-graph may be systematically built.,
